EXTENDING PREDATION ANALYSIS TO MONOPOLIST’S BUNDLED DISCOUNTS UNDER
SECTION 2: AN ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
In LePage’s v. 3M,1 the Third Circuit decided the first case at the federal appellate
court level that dealt with the subject of bundled discounts by a monopolist under Section
2 of the Sherman Act2 in the period following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation.3 Prior to the decision
in Brooke Group, the Third Circuit4 had only once before addressed this topic in
Smithkline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and Company.5 Smithkline is only significant because it
nearly suggested that any bundled discount, regardless of whether above or below cost,
was anti-competitive. At the time of Smithkline in 1978, the Third Circuit had therefore
not even considered monopolist bundled discounts with regard to products in the same
relevant market as constituting a very serious legal issue.6 Following Brooke Group,
however, practitioners believed that this state of affairs had changed. It is only well in
the aftermath of Brooke Group, following the LePage’s Inc. v. 3M decision, that this
issue has become the subject of vigorous debate.7

1

LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2002), vacating LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 277 F.3d 365 (3rd Cir.
2002), cert. denied 3M v. LePage’s Inc., 542 U.S. 953 (2004).
2
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony. . . .
Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. S. § 2 (2004)
3
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (defining the
predatory pricing standard for Section 2 of the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Pateman Act).
4
The Third Circuit is the only federal court of appeals to have ever addressed this issue.
5
Smithkline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3rd Cir. 1978).
6
Id. at 1057 (“The major question for decision is whether the district court . . . erred in defining the
relevant product market. . . .”).
7
See, e.g., Kenneth L. Glazer and Brian R. Henry, Coercive v. Incentivizing Conduct: A Way Out of the
Section 2 Impasse?, ANTITRUST, Summer 2003, at 49 (contending that Brooke Group required the Court in
LePage’s to reach a different result than it would have without Brooke Group); James A. Keyte, LePage’s
v. 3M – More Questions than Answers for the Lawful “Monopolist,” ANTITRUST, Summer 2003, at 27
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In Section 1, this Article explores how the Third Circuit should have decided in
Lepage’s and provides an answer to what should be the proper U.S. jurisprudence with
regard to this issue in light of Brooke Group and U.S. economic theory. In Section 2, this
Article proceeds to question this ideal U.S. jurisprudence by providing an EC
comparative perspective. In doing so, this Article tries not to laud one standard over the
other, but to precisely understand the philosophies, advantages, and disadvantages that
underlie each system beyond the veil of law and economics.
1. ABOVE-COST DISCOUNTING IN THE U.S.
1.1. Smithkline: Bundled Discount Law Prior to Brooke Group
Smithkline and Eli Lilly were both pharmaceuticals manufacturers in the relevant
market of the “nonprofit hospital market for a class of antiobiotic drugs known as
cephalosporins” in the United States.8 Eli Lilly first produced, patented, and
monopolized a drug branded by the name of Keflin and known generically as cephalothin
in 1964.9 Subsequently, it manufactured four other cephalosporins, branded and known
generically by the names of Keflex (cephalexin), Loridine (cephaloridine), Kafocin
(cephalexin), and Kefzol (cefazolin). Kefzol, or cefazolin in the generic, was the only
one of Eli Lilly’s cephalosporins that was not patented.10 Eli Lilly continued to enjoy
total dominance11 in the market from 1964 until 1973, at which point other
manufacturers, namely Smithkline, produced cephalosporin drugs.12

(highlighting the analytic schism between the majority and the dissent in LePage’s over the application of
Brooke Group).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 1059.
10
Id.
11
See id. at 1065 n. 15 (showing that the Smithkline Court estimated that Eli Lily controlled between
89.8% and 100% of the cephalosporin market between 1964 and 1973).
12
Id. at 1059.
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Beginning in 1973, Smithkline began to produce a drug branded by the name of
Ancef and known generically as cefazolin.13 Cefazolin was identical to Eli Lilly’s
Kefzol.14 After Smithkline began marketing Ancef, Eli Lilly responded by augmenting
its pre-existing quantity-based discount program,15 known as the Cephalosporin Savings
Plan (“CSP”), to include a percentage rebate that applied only when hospitals bought
minimum quantities among any three of Eli Lilly’s cephalosporin products.16 All of the
bundled discounts thus related to a relevant market in which Eli Lilly was a monopolist.
Before reaching its final conclusion, the Smithkline Court noted a policy-like
concern that Smithkline’s Ancef and Eli Lilly’s Kefzol, both cefazolin products, were
superior in quality to Eli Lilly’s other monopolized products in the cephalosoporin
relevant market.17 It then held that Eli Lilly had monopolized under Section 2 on the
basis of its obvious power to exclude and its “willful acquisition and maintenance of
monopoly power,” which was satisfied because the bundled discount linked a product
that faced competition, Kefzol, with products that did not face competition.18 As a result,
a “competitive” market for Ancef and Kefzol was replaced by a “non-competitive”
market, since Smithkline would be unable to equal Eli Lilly’s 3% rebate without offering
a 16% rebate.19

13

Id.
See id. (noting that Kefzol and Ancef were both licensed by a Japanese developer).
15
Compare Western Parcel Express v. UPS, 190 F.3d 974, 976 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that volume
discounts are categorically legal because they do not “preclude competition in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act”) with Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶768b2, at 148 (2d ed. 2002) (suggesting that
continuously increasing volume discounts or conditioning them on a one-year period could be
anticompetitive under the Sherman Act, since they would preclude equally efficient competitors of the
discounting firm from matching prices).
16
Smithkline Corp. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 (3rd Cir. 1978).
17
Id. at 1061.
18
Id. at 1065.
19
Id.
14
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Although Smithkline potentially suggested that any bundled discount was anticompetitive, one must identify facts that might limit the scope of this monopolization
conclusion. First, the bundled discount took place entirely within one relevant market,
cephalosporins. Second, under the bundled discount, sales within a competitive
submarket were linked to a monopolized submarket, thereby maintaining not only a
monopoly, but a dangerously inferior one in light of the Court’s policy calculation.
1.2. Brooke Group: The Emergence of Above-Cost Discounting Jurisprudence
Brooke Group Ltd. and Brown & Williamson were both olgiopolist tobacco
manufacturers.20 Since Brooke Group’s market share in the general cigarette market had
severely declined, it innovated the marketing of generic cigarettes in order to bolster its
market share.21 By 1984, Brooke Group had achieved 97% market share in the generic
segment.
Brown & Williamson, who until 1984 had only manufactured branded cigarettes,
was particularly affected by Brooke Group’s generic cigarettes innovation.22 In response
to its eroding market share, Brown & Williamson produced its own generic cigarettes
lines and provided wholesalers with volume discounts23 on them that made its wholesale

20

Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 212 (1993).
Id. at 212, 214.
22
Id. at 214 (noting that 20% of converts to Brooke Group’s generics came from Brown & Williamson,
which had only had 11.4% of the market for branded cigarettes).
23
Volume discounts are considered anti-competitive when the product so discounted is fungible, as was the
case with respect to the two company’s generic cigarettes in Brooke Group. See Phillip E. Areeda &
Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION,
¶768b2, at 149 (2d ed. 2002). Nevertheless, despite the fact that such a discount threatened to eliminate a
competitor, the Court relying on Brown Shoe, held that there was no harm to competition, since there was
no evidence of recoupment. This suggests that, by analogy, in Section 2, the definitive inquiry goes more
to the issue of recoupment than to exclusionary conduct.
21
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prices cheaper than Brooke Group’s generic cigarettes.24 Retail prices remained the
same.25
Brooke Group, in turn, responded with deeper discounts in the area of wholesale
rebates.26 This led to a price war between the two firms where Brown & Williamson
likely sold below cost.27 Brooke Group then brought a lawsuit against Brown &
Williamson, alleging price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act. Brooke
Group alleged that discounting below cost would forced it to raise the list price of its
generic cigarettes so as to effectively narrow the gap between prices in the branded and
generic markets. 28
In analyzing this claim, the Court first noted that Brooke Group had alleged a
predatory pricing scheme to harm a competitor, which it analogized to a Section 2 claim
under the Sherman Act.29 In order to prevail on this claim, Brooke Group had to show
“’a reasonable possibility’ of substantial injury to competition. . . .”30 This meant
showing both pricing below cost as well as a reasonable probability of recouping
profits.31
In announcing the below cost prong of predatory pricing, the Court stated very
broad principles that suggested that low prices never threatened competition unless they
24

Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 215.
This suggests that the Court’s holding in Brooke Group in favor of the discounting firm does not rest on
assumptions about end user consumer gains. See id.
26
Id. at 216.
27
See id. at 216, 231 (noting that a reasonable jury could conclude that Brown & Williamson priced below
cost).
28
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 217 (1993).
29
Id. at 220.
30
Id. at 222. The Court also stated that the Robinson-Patman Act demanded a broader reading of
competitive injury than Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See id. at 229 (noting that competitive injury under
the Robinson-Patman Act extends beyond the monopoly context). The Court noted that in the Section 2
context, the standard was “’a dangerous probability of actual monopolization.’” Id. This suggests per se
liability for a monopolist who predatorily priced.
31
Id. at 223-24. In the context of the Sherman Act, the Court noted that one would have to show a
“dangerous probability [] of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.” Id. at 224.
25
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were below predatory levels, regardless of the type of antitrust injury alleged.32 Although
the Court did assert the possibility of anti-competitive discounting above the predatory
level, it suggested that such discounting was “beyond the practical ability of a judicial
tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price
cutting.”33 These points are both critical because they threaten to overrule the Matsushita
framework for discounting, which focused entirely on the certainty and degree to which
the discounter could recoup.34
Given the Brooke Group Court’s definition of predatory pricing, one might
deduce that low prices only threatened competition in a cognizable sense when a) prices
were below cost;35 b) there was a reasonable or dangerous probability of recoupment; and
c) discounting and probability of recoupment, or predatory pricing as a whole, threatened
competition, or in the Section 2 context, monopolization.36
On the other hand, in the next paragraph, the Court very obliquely implied that
these broad principles might be tied to a particular context and a particular logic,

32

For example, the Court cited Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
Atlantic Richfield held: “Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long
as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition . . . . We have adhered to this principle
regardless of the type of antitrust claimed involved.” Id. at 340.
33
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993).
34
See Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1985). Under a rationale
that is entirely focused on recoupment, a monopolist that discounts will be per se liable under Section 2,
assuming that there are no competitors to enter the market upon elimination of the monopolist’s
competitors. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268
(1981) (asserting that a would-be monopolist must maintain its monopoly power a sufficiently long time in
order to recoup). This, however, is not true under a standard that requires below cost pricing. See R. Bork,
The Antitrust Paradox 145 (1978) (suggesting that the future flow of profits would exceed the discount
only for a would-be monopolist who was able to maintain position). The below cost discounting prong in
Brooke Group also casts doubt on the remand instructions in Matsushita that would allow a competitor to
show that a discounting plan was “economically senseless.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597-98. Such
evidence would only go to the question of recoupment.
35
There is considerable disagreement among lower courts over the appropriate measure of cost. The
Brooke Group Court did not answer this issue, since the parties agreed on average variable cost. See
Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223.
36
This deduction applies the elements of the Court’s predatory pricing definition combined with its rule
that predatory pricing must injury competition or lead to monopolization. See id. at 222-25.
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potentially suggesting that its principles could extend no farther than the oligopoly
context:
Even in an oligopolistic market, when a firm drops its prices to a
competitive level to demonstrate to a maverick the unprofitability of
straying from the group, it would be illogical to condemn the price: The
antitrust laws then would be an obstacle to the chain of events most
conducive to a breakdown of oligopoly pricing and the onset of
competition.37
The Court then noted that in the oligopoly context the consumer should not be
denied the benefit of the lower price in the short run even if the ultimate effect is to
“induce” supracompetitive pricing, the reasoning of which potentially might apply to
monopolies.38 However, one must realize that this statement presupposed a situation
where oligopoly pricing could potentially break down. Thus, based on the principles of
Brooke Group, competitive pricing should be, as a matter of law and policy, noncognizable only when both discounting may break down monopoly pricing and when
consumers39 may experience gains.
In addition, the above analysis regarding the applicability of predatory pricing
claims in the oligopoly context to any discounting in the monopoly context bears another
caveat.40 The Brooke Group Court asserted that the pre-requisites to recovery were so
difficult, in part, because lowering prices was not only the mechanism of predatory

37

Id. at 223.
Id. at 223-24.
39
Consumers should not be understood to mean only end users. In Brooke Group, despite the price war for
wholesale business, the list price itself never changed. See infra text accompanying note 25.
40
One might argue, as the LePage’s Court, that there is also a serious issue regarding the applicability of
predatory pricing to claims relating to discounting scenarios when predatory pricing is not asserted. See
LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 151 (3rd Cir. 2003) (en banc). Regardless of whether there is one
market or multiple markets, the economic rationale of Brooke Group would apply well in the oligopolistic
context. In this context, a decrease in price could always tend to at least immediately increase competition.
Furthermore, nothing in the Brooke Group opinion suggests that this case is conceptually limited apart
from its general economic rationale and its discussion of the oligopolistic context.
38
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pricing, but of stimulating competition.41 The cost of wrong judgments regarding
predatory pricing was therefore high. In the context of a monopoly, however, the cost of
a wrong judgment is arguably lower. A decrease in price cannot tend to increase
competition to the same extent where little to none exists.
1.3. Ortho Diagnostic Systems: Above-Cost Bundled Discount Analysis #1 – Toward a
Showing that Monopolist Price was Below Competitor Cost
Abbott Laboratories manufactured certain blood assays. These were: 1) HBsAg;
2) HBc or Anti-Core; 3) HCV; 4) HTLV; and 5) HIV – 1/2.42 Abbott alone
manufactured all five of these commonly used assays and it possessed monopoly market
shares in all of these five relevant markets, with the exception of HCV.43 Abbott’s
overall market share in assays was approximately “70 to 90 percent.”44 Ortho Diagnostic
Systems was a competitor to Abbott. It only widely offered three of the above tests,
HBsAg, Anti-Core, and HCV.45
In the fall of 1992, Abbott concluded a contract with the Council of Community
Blood Centers (“CCBC”), a group of blood donor centers that constituted a large
percentage of potential assay customers.46 The relevant features of the CCBC were as

41

Id. at 226 (“The mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing – lower prices – is the same
mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition; because cutting prices in order to increase business
often is the very essence of competition. . . .”).
42
Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
43
Id. at 458, 459 n. 3 (showing Abbott’s market share percentages in the five assays).
44
Id. at 459.
45
Id.
46
See id. at 458 (noting that the Red Cross and CCBC members together accounted for 85-90% of the
blood gathered by blood donor centers).
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follows. First, the contract was for three years.47 Second, discounts were given to
customers that agreed to purchase either four or five assay products.48
This lawsuit arose when Ortho alleged, inter alia, under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, that Abbott had used its monopoly power to effectively force CCBC members to buy
Abbott assays.49 Specifically, Ortho asserted that since it did not widely manufacture
HTLV and HIV – 1/2, CCBC members would have to buy these products from Abbott
and in turn would be coerced50 into purchasing the other three types of assays from
Abbott.51 This is because the CCBC could not have afforded to forego the discount on
the other three products once they were already roped into purchasing Abbott products.
The Court proceeded to analyze this as follows. First, it cited Griffith52 and
Berkey53 for the broad proposition that while a monopolist could not “employ the power
derived from a dominant position in the market,” it could “utilize the advantages of
size.”54 In the context of discounting or pricing, the Court suggested that a firm used its
dominant power as opposed to its size when it drove “its competitors out of business with
the intention thereafter of using its market power to restrict output, raise prices, and
recoup the losses sustained in the competitive battle and then to enjoy the fruits of
monopoly profits in the future.”55

47

Id.
Greater discounts were given to those who purchased five assay products than four assay products. No
discounts were given to those who purchased less than three assay products. See id. at 460.
49
Id. at 463 (“The first [claim] asserts that Abbott had monopoly power in one or more of the alleged
markets for HBsAg, Anti-core, HTLV and HIV – 1/2 sold to BDCs and that the package pricing features of
the CCBC contract unlawfully maintained that power.”).
50
But cf. Glazer & Henry, supra note 7, at 45 (making an argument that bundled discounts that give
genuine discounts are not coercive, but incentivizing, and thereby give consumers better prices and choice).
51
Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
52
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948).
53
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979).
54
Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. , 920 F. Supp. at 465.
55
Id. at 466.
48
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Economically, this meant that below cost pricing definitely ran afoul of Section 2
of the Sherman Act. “The reason is plain: below-cost pricing, unlike pricing at or above
that level, carries with it the threat that the party so engaged will drive equally efficient
competitors out of business, thus setting the stage for recoupment at the expense of
consumers.”56 Thus, the Ortho Court viewed the below cost prong of Brooke Group as
representing something akin to a qualification of judicial economy and nothing more.57
For this reason, it found Brooke Group inapplicable in the bundled discount
context, where it was possible for a competitor who bundled discounts to eliminate a
more efficient competitor. This could be accomplished, for example, in a two-product
situation when the discount on a second purchased product exceeded the extra efficiency
of the second competitor.58 Under this line of analysis, “the fact that the components of
Abbott’s package all are priced at or above variable cost [was] not alone fatal to Ortho’s
Section 2 claims.”59 However, since Abbott’s assays were priced above Ortho’s costs,
there was no threat to eliminating an efficient competitor and thus no threat to
competition in this particular case.60
1.4. Concord Boat: Non-Bundled Fidelity Discounts
Brunswick Corporation was a manufacturer of stern drive engines, which it sold
to boat manufacturers.61 Unlike Brooke Group, Brunswick was a monopolist. It
possessed 75% market share in 1983.62

56

Id.
This view is not entirely consistent with Brooke Group, the rationale of which was rather the fact that
cutting prices was broadly the engine of competition and narrowly the means by which consumers could
enjoy the interim competitive fruits of an oligopoly world. See infra Section 2.2.
58
For a more elaborate hypothetical, see Ortho, 920 F. Supp. at 467.
59
Id. at 468.
60
Id. at 469. For a discussion of how this concept should be incorporated as an element of Section 2
discounting analysis in the above cost pricing context, see infra Section 2.5.
61
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2000).
57
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In 1984, Brunswick began offering a discounting program to boat manufacturers
for stern engines. This program consisted of three types of discounts, discounts for multiyear contracts, volume discounts, and market share percentage63 discounts.64 Neither of
these programs contained exclusive dealing requirements, since “none of the programs
restricted the ability of builders and dealers to purchase engines from other engine
manufacturers.”65
The boat builders who bought the stern engines from Brunswick subsequently
brought a lawsuit, contending, inter alia, that the discount programs were an attempt to
exclude competitors and that it enabled Brunswick to charge supracompetitive prices in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.66 Specifically, they argued that the discount
killed competition at the stern engine level, since Brunswick had effectively placed
“golden handcuffs” on the boat manufacturers that effectively kept them from dealing
with other engine manufacturers.67 The Court accordingly framed the usual Section 2
inquiry as whether Brunswick had possessed monopoly power in the relevant market and
whether that monopoly power was willfully maintained through anticompetitive
conduct.68
The Court, like the Brooke Group Court, first proceeded very broadly. It cited the
already mentioned principle of Atlantic Richfield, cited by the Brooke Group Court, that

62

Id.
Market share percentage discounts happen where a seller discounts by a certain percentage in exchange
for the customer accepting to buy a certain percentage of its market share. See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert
Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶768b2,
at 148 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that market share discounts are less likely than quantity discounts to price
discriminate against customers).
64
Concord Boat, 920 F. Supp. at 1044.
65
Id. at 1045.
66
Id. at 1060.
67
Id.
68
Id.
63
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“low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set. . . .”69 It further
noted, again citing Atlantic Richfield that in the absence of predatory prices, losses
stemming from pricing “cannot be said to stem from an anticompetitive aspect of the
defendant’s conduct.”70 Finally, it discussed the aforementioned concern in Brooke
Group that Courts could not efficiently distinguish legitimate conduct from hocus pocus
price cutting claims.71 Largely based on these principles, the Court arrived at “the
general rule that above cost discounting is not anticompetitive.”72 The Court thus had no
difficulty concluding that cutting prices was a sufficient business justification under
Section 2, particularly since there were no exclusive dealing contracts.73
This case is significant in discounting jurisprudence because it is the first court of
appeals case to find that even a monopolist could engage in heavy discounting that
encompassed a wide array of discounting schemes, including a market share scheme,
provided that there were no exclusive dealing contracts and that pricing was above cost.
However, this case, like Ortho, is arguably inconsistent with Brooke Group. At a
minimum, it pushes the limit of Brooke Group, since existing monopolists who discount
do not increase competition to the same extent.74 On the other hand, Brooke Group
equally asserted the Atlantic Richfield proposition that the below cost pricing prong

69

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990); See supra text accompanying
note 33.
70
Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1061 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Atlantic Richfield,
495 U.S. 328 at 340-41). In the light of Brooke Group, it is extremely difficult to maintain that above cost
pricing is predation, since below cost pricing is now an element of predatory pricing. See supra text
accompanying note 35.
71
Id. at 1062.
72
Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1061. The Court claimed to arrive at this rule based on Matsushita as well as
Brooke Group. Although Brooke Group may reasonably suggest this rule, Matsushita does not allow such
an inference. See supra note 35.
73
Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1062-63 (defining exclusive dealing contracts very strictly).
74
See supra text accompanying note 41.
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applies to all antitrust violations.75 One might thus conclude that the Eighth Circuit in
Concord Boat was the first court of appeals to resolve a fundamental tension in Brooke
Group in favor of extending application of its predation standard to monopolies.
1.5. LePage’s
3M manufactured Scotch tape as well as its own brand of private label tape called
“Highland.”76 Until the early 1990s, it had a market share above 90% in transparent tape,
which was the relevant market encompassing both private label and branded tape.77
LePage’s manufactured its own brand of private label and possessed an 88% market
share in private label tape in 1992. Its overall market share in transparent tape was a
comparatively low 14.4%.78
In 1993, 3M began a program called the “Partnership Growth Fund”79 with which
it offered bundled discounts to LePage’s customers.80 The bundled discount program not
only provided considerable rebates, but spanned six lines of products, set target growth
rates for each product, and required that all requirements be met upon penalty of losing
the whole discount.81 The six lines of products that it spanned were: health care products,
home care products, home improvement products, stationery products (including
transparent tape), retail audio products, and leisure time products.82

75

See supra text accompanying note 33.
LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 144 (3rd Cir. 2003) (en banc).
77
Id. Private label tape refers to “tape sold under the retailer’s name rather than under the name of the
manufacturer.” Id.
78
Id. at 161.
79
The program was originally called the “Executive Growth Fund.” Id. at 154.
80
Id. at 154, 165. The LePage Court further asserted that the discounts “induced [customers] to eliminate
or reduce their purchases of tape from LePage’s.” Id. at 154.
81
Id.
82
Id.
76
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By 1997, LePage’s market share in transparent tape had dropped to 9.35%, a
decline of 35%.83 LePage’s then brought a lawsuit, alleging, inter alia, that 3M’s bundled
discount program violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, since “3M maintained its
monopoly by stifling growth of private label tape and by coordinating efforts aimed at
large distributors to keep retail prices for Scotch tape high.”84
The Court began its analysis by highlighting certain broad legal principles that
have been established throughout the history of Section 2 of the Sherman Act that related
to the meaning of “willfully acquired or maintained” power by monopolists, since 3M
was clearly a monopolist.85 First, Alcoa86 suggested that a monopolist could not keep
growing if entering competitors could not succeed. Second, American Tobacco noted
that competition was essential and that neither exclusion nor intent was necessary for
Section 2 liability.87 Third, Lorain Journal held that although it was generally lawful to
refuse to deal, this is not so when a monopolist does with the intent to eliminate a
competitor.88 More broadly, it suggested that monopolists who have an evil intent might
be liable under Section 2 for otherwise benign conduct, particularly where the malignant
effects on competition were readily foreseeable. Fourth, Grinnell had held that mergers,
non-competition covenants and pricing practices (which subsidized non-monopolized
geographical areas with profits from monopolized geographical areas) could not be
lawfully employed to achieve monopoly status.89 Fifth, Aspen implied that a monopolist
could not even refuse to cooperate with competitors where there was a deliberate intent to
83

Id. at 165.
Id. at 144-45.
85
Id. at 146 (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966)).
86
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
87
American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
88
Lorain Journal Co. v. U.S., 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
89
U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
84
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discourage rivals, absent a clear efficiency justification.90 Finally, Kodak held that a
monopolist could not engage in exclusionary action to leverage an existing monopoly
into another market.91
Overall, the Court’s purpose in synthesizing these principles was to communicate
that Section 2 jurisprudence in discounting cases cannot be simplistically reduced to a
Brooke Group predation analysis, “a decision that was primarily concerned with the
Robinson-Patman Act, not §2.”92 This was because 3M’s principal and only serious
defense was the Brooke Group notion that “‘[a]bove-cost pricing cannot give rise to an
antitrust offense as a matter of law, since it the very conduct that the antitrust laws wish
to promote in the interest of making consumers better off.’”93 Against this argument, the
Court was attempting to explain that one non-monopolist case that did not even take
place in the confines of Section 2 could not suggest a principle that conflicted with nearly
one hundred years of Sherman Act jurisprudence.
The applicability of such broad principles is unclear, since none of them
specifically relate to the discounting context. One could therefore on this basis alone
conclude that such principles are not definitive, since there are cases such as Matsushita
and Brooke Group that are more analogous, monopoly context or not. As noted above,
Brooke Group suggested that above cost discounting, which gives customers better prices
in the short run, should categorically be allowed in the monopoly context if it generally
presented a possibility of stimulating competition or if courts would be unable to
generally distinguish between pro-competitive and anti-competitive above cost

90

Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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discounting.94 The question, then, is whether and when discounting in the monopoly
context would ever have the potential to break down the monopoly structure, or at least to
arguably break it down that the judiciary should end its inquiry as a matter of economy.
Areeda & Hovenkamp assert that in the monopoly context “anticompetitive
effects [from discounting] are only likely when the large firm can offer a larger variety of
products or services than the smaller firm does.”95 This is clearly the situation at hand in
LePage’s. The economic fear is that equally efficient smaller competitors that could
match the discount on one product alone will be foreclosed from the market.
However, Areeda & Hovenkamp never maintain that anticompetitive effects
necessarily result from a monopolist’s bundled discounts. Thus, one might argue under
Brooke Group that bundled discounts may have the potential to break down the
monopolist’s structure. Notwithstanding this possibility, the rationale of Brooke Group
does not appear to hold very well when anticompetitive effects are likely. This is
especially true if the judiciary is capable of distinguishing procompetitive from
anticompetitive effects in the monopoly context. However, since bundled discounting is
the only context where anticompetitive effects are likely, in other discounting contexts,
the rationale of Brooke Group should hold even in the monopoly context.96
One additional question that arises is a more focused issue, whether all types of
bundled discounts are likely to foreclose competition.97 This issue ties into Ortho, which
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held that discounting above the monopolist’s competitor’s cost was not anticompetitive,
since there was no possibility of eliminating an equally efficient competitor.98
From the point of view of economic theory, the Ortho Court’s legal analysis of
bundled discounts in the monopoly context makes sense for the following reasons. A
competitor who is not and will not be foreclosed can always match the monopolist’s
prices, since its pricing must logically be above marginal cost. Such a situation
eliminates the possibility of the only anticompetitive effect that can result from
discounting.99 This will have the effect of at least temporarily lowering prices and
increasing competition, despite the monopolist’s malignant purpose.100 Thus, one might
argue that the broad principles of Atlantic Richfield and Brooke Group apply to above
cost discounting that is also above the competitor’s cost: “Low prices benefit consumers
. . . and . . . do not threaten competition. . . .”101 Moreover, Brooke Group would assert
that the cost of wrong judgments is too high in this scenario, since competition is not
being decreased.102
How Brooke Group might apply to monopolist above cost discounting ultimately
depends on if one reads it as applying to any discounting context where injury to
competition is unlikely. Brooke Group, after all, never said that it would evaluate every
possible permutation of oligopoly sub-contexts in order to determine whether injury to
competition was likely. On the other hand, there is no literature to suggest that the
Smithkline competition inquiry); Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 920 F. Supp.
455, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
98
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100
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oligopoly context required such a multi-tiered analysis. The monopoly context is
different because discounting dangers fade out and reappear at various points.
For example, at the broadest metaphysical level, anticompetitive effects are
surprisingly unlikely in the monopoly context as a whole.103 At a more particular level,
that of bundled discounts within monopolies, competitive injury is likely.104 Finally, at
an even more particular level, that of bundled discounts that are priced above competitor
cost, competitive injury is again unlikely.105 This is visually illustrated in Figure 1.106
The current U.S. court jurisprudence is unclear. No Court has analyzed
monopolist discounting by looking at the monopoly context as a whole, though Brooke
Group might suggest this approach, since discounting in the monopoly context as a whole
will generally lead to competitive results. The LePage’s Court, however, looked at the
likelihood of competitive injury in the bundled discount context. Finally, the Ortho
Court and the LePage’s dissent analyzed the likelihood of competitive injury in the above
cost bundled discount context.107
Depending on the level of abstraction at which this analysis is applied, i.e.,
whether it is applied in the monopoly context by itself or in the above competitor cost
monopoly context, above-cost prices could potentially be either a defense in certain cases
or a total defense in monopoly discounting under Brooke Group. Applying likelihood
analysis on more and more particular levels will lead to increasingly murky
103
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predictability. However, if Brooke Group applies beyond the oligopoly context, the
Supreme Court should decide at which levels this analysis applies and not extend it too
far to make it unwieldy.
This would be a daunting task, since the facts arguably change the probability of
the analysis. For example, in LePage’s, the Court likely analogized bundled discounts to
tying in part due to the additional element of target growth rates. Applying Brooke
Group thus has the danger of precluding judicial flexibility. The counter-argument is that
if no other type of discounting is potentially anti-competitive, then the law should reflect
that any discount that is above competitor cost is competitive.108 This, in turn, means that
the Supreme Court should at least provide the monopolist defendant with an affirmative
defense that his pricing was above competitor cost. In fact, given the potential consumer
benefit of discounting above competitor cost, the Supreme Court should probably require
plaintiff to prove that the monopolist’s pricing was below her cost and that she was
efficient enough to compete on a product-by-product basis.109
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Fig 1:
Monopolist
Discounting

Above
Competitor
Cost
Injury is
unlikely.
See Ortho.

Bundled Discount Level
Competitive injury is likely.
See LePage’s.

Monopoly Level as a Whole
Competitive injury is unlikely

After relating and applying broad Section 2 principles, the LePage’s Court tried to
find additional reasons why Brooke Group should not apply. First, it noted that
recoupment was possible in this case, unlike in Brooke Group.110 Second, it tried to limit
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Brooke Group to the oligopoly context.111 Third, it noted that LePage’s had never
asserted a predatory pricing claim.112
The possibility of recoupment is by itself irrelevant, since extending Brooke
Group would require below cost pricing as well as recoupment. Only if the below cost
pricing prong is not needed in a given monopoly context does this distinguishing matter.
In addition, one cannot distinguish this case from Brooke Group merely on the basis of
the inherent differences between the oligopoly and the monopoly context. First, the
Concord Boat Court, without even flinching, applied Brooke Group to the monopoly
fidelity rebate context, outside of the bundled discount sub-context.113 Second, the Ortho
Court applied a Brooke Group-like analysis even within the bundled discount subcontext, when the monopolist did not price above her competitor’s cost. These
approaches are consistent with the broad language of Brooke Group and Atlantic
Richfield.114 The Concord Boat Court additionally noted that its approach is correct
because Matsushita and Brooke Group placed an emphasis on the “actual facts or
realities of the marketplace.”115 Outside of the bundled discount context, there is simply
no danger under U.S. efficiency notions to competition from discounting, monopoly
context or not. Moreover, even within the bundled discount context, as noted above, the
danger is not absolute and should therefore be ascertained with regard to the “actual
facts.”
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The fact that LePage’s never asserted a predatory pricing claim should also have
no bearing on the monopolization analysis. The Ortho Court previously addressed this
question in a footnote and explained that what is relevant in Section 2 cases is whether
conduct transgresses the monopolization, attempted monopolization or leveraging
standard.116 This view seems correct as the alleged violation is Section 2, not a specific
predatory pricing statute. Predation is the sole mode of analysis, rather than broad
Section 2 principles, by which certain monopolization conduct117 should be narrowly
evaluated when there is discounting that is either not likely to be anticompetitive, or
raises issues that are as a practical matter of economy too difficult for the judiciary.118
In the next increment of its opinion, the LePage’s Court consulted an array of
primarily court of appeals’ decisions in order to determine what type of conduct could be
said to be “exclusionary or anticompetitive” under Section 2.119 In sum, the basic point
that the LePage’s Court noted was that any action by a monopolist to drive competitors
from the market violated Section 2. This is illustrated by how “[e]ven unfair tortious
conduct unrelated to a monopolist’s pricing policies [had] been held to violate § 2.”120 In
particular, it cited the Sixth Circuit Conwood case that found a Section 2 violation where
a monopolist essentially physically wreaked havoc on its competitor’s products in stores
by removing their product racks.121 Conwood is an interesting Section 2 case. However,
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as the LePage’s Court itself noted, it did not take place in the pricing context. In the nonpricing context, exclusionary conduct by itself is sufficient to impose antitrust liability,
whether or not actual foreclosure is likely to occur, since there is no countervailing
consumer benefit. In a discounting context, however, as has been shown above, a
different analysis is required.
After considering the exclusionary conduct case law, the LePage’s Court turned
its attention to the economic theory of bundled discounts and to its own Third Circuit
precedent in Smithkline.122 It analogized the bundled discounts to tying and suggested
that customers would buy from 3M only to receive a greater discount on a product that
LePage’s did not produce, not due to the quality or price of 3M’s products.123 The Court,
however, neglected to consider, as mentioned above, that discounting above competitor
cost cannot have anticompetitive effects.124 If the victim competitor can likely still
compete, then nothing limits Brooke Group’s presumption that lower prices drives free
competition.125
The LePage’s Court’s reliance on Smithkline is also misplaced. First, as already
noted, the plaintiff in Smithkline, as in Ortho, proved that it was unable to match
prices.126 In the pricing context, due to the confluence of case law and economic theory
regarding consumer benefit from discounting, this is absolutely essential. Any other rule
protects competitors at the expense of competition.
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Even aside from contemporary Supreme Court precedent and economic theory,
the LePage’s decision is arguably at odds with Smithkline. The LePage’s Court
summarily concluded that “3M bundled its rebates for Scotch-brand tape with other
products it sold in much the same way that Lilly bundled its rebates for Kefzol with
Keflin and Keflex.”127 This is not entirely accurate. Lilly used its monopoly in Keflin
and Keflex to force customers to buy Kefzol instead of its competitor’s Ancef. If 3M
used its monopoly power, it was to force customers of non-transparent tape product lines
to buy 3M products instead of those of its competitors. It is not clear therefore how 3M
could have linked its competitive product with LePage’s within the meaning of
Smtihklline. Certainly, if linking existed, it is dubious whether it was the type of linkage
that “directly affected the price, supply, and demand” of LePage’s product.128
Rather, it seems any such effect would have been indirect, since purchasing
private label tape was not directly tied into the purchase of branded tape. To the extent
that 3M’s discounted bundling scheme required purchasing LePage’s substitutes, it was
only by virtue of non-monopolized products in other lines. This was arguably merely
linking a competitive product with a non-competitive product, a question that Smithkline
did not necessarily address.
After considering whether the bundled discounts were anticompetitive, the Court
proceeded to consider whether there were exclusive dealing contracts.129 3M argued that
it had not engaged in exclusive dealing because only two of its contracts were expressly
exclusive and because its agreements were not found to rise to the level of exclusivity
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required under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.130 The Court, however, asserted that
exclusivity could also be an element of a Section 2 monopolization claim and that
contracts could be exclusive even when not expressly exclusive.131
The relationship between bundled discounts and exclusive contracts is an
extremely difficult one. On the one hand, one could argue that exclusive contracts that
relate to price should be analyzed under the same Brooke Group framework, since they
are part of the pricing context. However, it seems correct to assert that exclusive
contracts should be analyzed under more general Section 2 principles, since they do not
pertain to discounting as such.132 In other words, inevitable conflicts between the pricing
context and Aspen should be resolved by ascertaining whether the nexus between the
exclusive contract and the discounting is not sufficiently strong.133 Relationships
between a supplier and a customer where the customer is not literally coerced should
generally be analyzed as having a nexus to discounting as such. If the nexus is not
sufficient, however, then any exclusive conduct should be analyzed under a Section 2
rule of reason approach and subject to a justification defense.134
130
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If there is not a sufficient nexus between exclusionary contracts and discounting,
one must ask what constitutes an exclusionary contract. The LePage’s Court cited
Tampa Electric for the proposition that exclusionary contracts were those that
“effectively foreclosed the business of competitors.”135 Tampa Electric, however,
involved a twenty year contract with no termination provision, which would preclude a
customer from seeking better prices if the contract covered her supply requirements.136
In LePage’s, however, there was no evidence that 3M customers could not generally
forego the rebates and purchase from LePage’s.137 If the monopolist’s customer is not
locked into the monopolist’s supply on a prolonged basis, then there is less reason to find
an exclusive contract in any fidelity discount context.138
The LePage’s Court finally proceeded to consider whether the 3M’s exclusionary
conduct was anticompetitive and suggested that a monopolist’s conduct was
anticompetiive if the monopolist excluded a “competitor . . . from the essential facilities
that would permit it to achieve the efficiencies of scale necessary to threaten the
monopoly.”139 On the discounting aspect by itself, Microsoft should not apply if it flies
in the face of Brooke Group. The exclusionary conduct aspect beyond mere discounting
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presents a more difficult issue, but Microsoft ultimately should not apply in the
discounting context in the absence of exclusionary contracts. If there are no exclusionary
contracts, i.e., if the nexus between the discount and the conduct is sufficiently strong,
then the discount should be analyzed under the proposed Brooke Group framework.140
However, if there actually were exclusive contracts in LePage’s, then nothing bars
application of Microsoft.
2. ABOVE COST MONOPOLIST DISCOUNTING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
2.1. Introduction to EC Competition Law
Unlike in the United States, the issue of monopolist discount schemes is starkly
simple in the EC. The Head of Unit at the Directorate General for Competition of the
European Commission recently summarized the state of the law as follows: “One usually
refers to ‘fidelity’ or ‘loyalty’ rebates to denote the discounting practices which may raise
antitrust concerns under Art. 82 E.C. Treaty or Section 2 of the Sherman Act and to
‘quantity’ rebates to describe the lawful discounting practices.”141
Nonetheless, on a more detailed plane, all monopolist discounting issues are dealt
with under Article 82 of the EC Treaty. Article 82 contains a list of “abuses” that is nonexhaustive.142 It reads:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade
between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular consist in:
140
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(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.143
However, since the list is non-exhaustive, the EC has the power to find abuses in
discounting decisions on broader criteria beyond Article 82’s enumerations. The Court
of First Instance144 stated in Tetra Pak: “Article 86 [now Article 82] covers all conduct
of an undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to hinder the maintenance or
growth of the degree of competition still existing in a market where, as a result of the
very presence of that undertaking, competition is weakened.”145 A dominant position
was defined in LaRoche, a previous case, as a position of economic strength that allows a
firm to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors.146
The broad inquiry is therefore similar to Section 2 analysis in that neither
dominant position analysis nor monopoly analysis prohibits such a position, absent
evidence that the position was used to diminish competition. Nevertheless, the
application of abuse of dominant position analysis in the EC has yielded results in the
discounting context that are often at odds with U.S. monopolization analysis. In the next
three sections, this Paper considers how the EC has applied Article 82 in both the belowcost and above-cost discounting context in non-fidelity, fidelity, and bundled rebates.
143
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2.2. Hoffman-LaRoche
LaRoche was the first EC case to deal with the same question as was presented in
LePage’s, the question of bundled discounts. On appeal, the Court of Justice, the highest
Court in the EC, found that LaRoche had a dominant position in all of the bundled
markets. These were vitamins A, B2, B3, B6, C, E, and H.147 It furthermore proceeded
to find that LaRoche had abused its dominant position on two bases, exclusive contracts
and fidelity rebates that gave customers the incentive to deal exclusively with
LaRoche.148
The Court of Justice149 then gave its reasons for its condemnation of bundled
discounts. First, it focused on the intent to prevent customers from obtaining supplies
from competing producers. It implied that this was problematic because it was “different
from [methods of competition] which condition normal competition in products or
services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators” and thus had the effect
of hindering competition.150 Second, the Court of Justice also noted that the effect of the
bundled discounts would be to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions,
disadvantaging customers that did not participate.151 This in itself ran afoul of Article
82(c) of the EC Treaty.
LaRoche thus had the effect of firmly prohibiting bundled discounts in the EC as
early as 1978. However, in the following years, Areeda & Turner’s economic analysis of
above-cost discounting spread to the EC. These changes suggested a potential change in
how the EC would view bundled discounts.
147
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2.3. AKZO
The case that laid the groundwork for a distinction between below-cost
discounting and above-cost discounting is AKZO/ECS,152 which was handed down by the
EC Commission. AKZO was a monopolist in the organic peroxides, while ECS was an
up and coming competitor in the flour additive segment of organic peroxides.153 AKZO
threatened ECS to force it from the market and subsequently engaged in below cost
pricing in the flour additive segment.154 The Commission, based primarily on the
strategic objective of price cutting alone, ruled for ECS.155
The Court of Justice, however, heavily influenced by Areeda & Turner, decided
there should be a separate analysis for below-cost and above-cost discounting.156 Thus, it
held that discounting below cost was presumptively predatory, while discounting above
cost was predatory if there was a plan by a dominant firm to eliminate a competitor.157
AKZO had similar economic concerns to the Brooke Group Court in the United
States. Brooke Group, however, unlike AKZO, patently suggested that above-cost
discounting would not violate antitrust law at least under certain conditions.158 The
Concord Boat Court thus essentially extended Brooke Group to monopolists outside of
the bundled discount context. And although LePage’s so far limits a further extension, it
is entirely conceivable that the Supreme Court, if it grants certiorari, might apply Brooke
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Group in the bundled discount context when a monopolist’s product is priced above
competitor cost.159 Subsequent European Courts, as shown below, nevertheless heavily
limited AKZO and found reasons why the above-cost framework should not apply.
2.4. Above-Cost Discounting After AKZO
In Hilti, the Commission asserted that a case of monopolist above-cost
discounting did “not hinge on whether the prices were blow costs. . . .”160 Hilti was a nail
gun and nail manufacturer that engaged in selective discounts aimed at stopping
competitors’ customers from purchasing competitor nails.161 Its means namely included
tying, bundled discounts, inducing dealers not to fulfill orders, and selective pricing.162
The Court primarily found these practices to be an abuse because of Hilti’s “attempts to
prevent or limit the entry of independent producers of Hilti-compatible consumables into
these markets.”163
Subsequently, in Irish Sugar, the Court made it plainly clear that even single line
above-cost market share and target rebates would not be tolerated in the non-bundled
context. Both rebates were essentially rejected because they were not “normal quantity
discount[s]” and had the “effect of tying a customer to the dominant supplier.”164
Clearly, the European Courts, as shown in Irish Sugar, have a different
understanding of tying a customer to a dominant supplier than the U.S. courts. In
Concord Boat, the theory of “golden handcuffs” was rejected as long as an agreement did
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not by its terms prevent a customer from dealing with a competitor.165 Nonetheless, it is
now settled European law that non-quantitative based discounting will run afoul of
Article 82 simply because it provides an incentive to deal exclusively with the
monopolist, regardless of whether it is above-cost.166
3. CONCLUSION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The U.S. and the EC are not so different in their rationales. As has already been
shown, both the U.S. and the EC deal with above-cost monopolist discounting by broadly
prohibiting conduct that will result in a diminution of competition. The broad economic
rationale in both the U.S. and the EC is also similar. In attempting to clarify outstanding
ambiguities regarding EC discounting law, the Commission recently stated that the
enforcer’s intervention in discounting is tricky “because it is inspired by faith in
competition as a process of rivalry between competitors and in this process’ contribution
to customer and consumer welfare in the longer run. This ‘faith’ should not be of the
religion kind but have sound economic underpinnings. If not, the enforcer might end up
protecting one or more competitors in rivalry rather than the structural process of rivalry
between all of them.”167 This obviously echoes what the U.S. Supreme Court has itself
often stated.168
Furthermore, the Commission has stated that in its view “dominant companies
will be living dangerously under Art. 82 when they offer prices which equally efficient
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rival competitors cannot match.”169 These words appear similar to the logic that has
driven the U.S. position that single line discounts are always acceptable, absent an
exclusive contract.170 This economic rationale is that: “For single-item discounts, no
matter how measured or aggregated, injury to an equally efficient rival seems
implausible.”171 Nevertheless, the EC and the U.S. results curiously diverge, particularly
in the area of above-cost single line non-bundled fidelity rebates.172 This divergence is
visually illustrated below.
United States
Allowed.
Allowed. See Concord
Boat.
Not Allowed, but Supreme
Court could in the future
conceivably allow in certain
cases under Brooke Group.

Quantitative Discount
Non-Bundled Fidelity
Discount
Bundled Discount

EC
Allowed.
Not Allowed. See Irish
Sugar.
Not Allowed. See LaRoche.

If the rationale is to avoid eliminating equally efficient competitors in both the
U.S. and the EC, the only explanation for the divergence is that the U.S. and the EC have
different ideas about what it means to eliminate an equally efficient competitor. In the
EC, case law suggests that only quantitative based discounting does not eliminate equally
efficient competitors. It also suggests, after Irish Sugar, that quantitative based
discounting is discounting that does not incentivize a customer to deal exclusively with a
monopolist. The implication in efficiency terms is that a competitor of a monopolist is
not less efficient than the monopolist because he cannot similarly incentivize his
customers. Under U.S law, however, it would be assumed in a single line context that
169
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such a competitor was not equally efficient. In other words, U.S. law assumes that
competitors should be able to compete with the monopolist in a single context,
notwithstanding any qualities inhering in monopoly itself. Any such inherent qualities,
under U.S. law, are implicitly viewed as efficiencies.173
The EC view, however, cannot help but imply that there is some evil inhering in
the monopoly itself that ultimately makes it less efficient, since an inability to compete in
single line non-bundled fidelity discounts can only stem from a tangible efficiency. This
view is perhaps rooted in the fact that few monopolies were historically acquired through
skill or ingenuity, but were “created by regulations, government subsidies, or permitted
combinations. . . .”174 Regardless of the origin of the view, it implies that somehow or
other, despite immediate operational efficiencies, monopolist discounting that
incentivizes loyalty will end up crushing competitors to the detriment of competition.
Efficiency in the EC thus obtains a profoundly historical sense. The efficiency of
size, if it exists, does not exceed the efficiency of time. Although different from the U.S.
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view, the EC view seems to be based in solid economic theory. The ultimate resolution
between the two views is more metaphysical than economic, since it is ultimately
impossible to know which efficiency is greater. On the one hand, EC law might
foreclose synthesized progressive efforts that are intimately tied to size. On the other
hand, U.S. law might foreclose the struggle that is also essential to progress.
As for the uncertainty in the U.S. regarding bundled discounts, the comparison
between EC and U.S. law over non-bundled above-cost discounts helps to remind us that
the efficiency rationale used by U.S. economists and implicit in Brooke Group and
Concord Boat is functionally normative. At the same time, it lends support for the
argument previously advanced in this Paper that U.S. law should incorporate an element
into the bundled discount context that requires a plaintiff to show that he was equally
efficient and that the total discount did not fall below the competitor cost, if the Supreme
Court essentially upholds the reasoning in LePage’s that implies that monopolist
competitors should not be expected to compete at the bundled discount level. This
efficiency showing should be required because U.S. law does categorically expect the
efficient non-monopolist to be able to compete on its own in single line contexts. The
above competitor cost showing should be required because U.S. law does expect
companies to be able to compete when it is possible. In sum, it is fundamentally
inconceivable under U.S. conceptions of efficiency and the logic of size175 that a
company could not compete with a countervailing incentive plan when the monopolist
prices above the competitor cost, absent a genuine exclusive agreement.
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